Comparing Environmental Risk Regulations in China and the United States

• Published in: Risk analysis Vol. 42; no. 4; pp. 730 - 756
• Main Authors: Li, Huanhong, Xu, Jianhua, Wiener, Jonathan B.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: United States Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.04.2022
• Subjects: Agriculture; Air Pollutants - analysis; Air pollution; Case studies; Chemicals; China; comparative law; Environmental aspects; environmental regulation; Environmental risk; Environmental risks; Europe; Evidential reasoning; Health status; Pollutants; Public health; Regulation; Risk; Risk assessment; Risk factors; stringency; Toxic chemicals; United States; United States; China; Europe; United States > US; evidential reasoning; stringency; comparative law; environmental regulation; Environmental risks
• ISSN: 0272-4332; 1539-6924
• DOI: 10.1111/risa.13797

The relative stringency of risk regulation across countries may have significant implications for public health and environmental outcomes, as well as for economic and trade impacts. In this study, we build on prior literature—which has often employed qualitative case studies, and has often focused on comparing the United States and Europe—by using a quantitative evidential reasoning approach to compare the relative stringency of federal/central level written rules for 45 randomly selected environmental risks in the United States and China. We find that, on average, in this sample of 45 environmental risks, the written rules for environmental risk regulation were more stringent in the United States than in China. Within this sample, we find that relative stringency was selective, leaning in both directions, as the United States and China each regulated some risks more stringently than the other; for example, the US written rules were more stringent for risks of toxic chemicals and most air pollutants, whereas China's written rules were more stringent for risks in agriculture. We also observe nuanced differences in relative regulatory stringency within sectors and risks; even where one country regulated one risk more stringently, the other country may regulate certain aspects of that risk more stringently. We comment on possible explanations for the patterns we observe. Our methods and findings may contribute to better understanding of comparative risk regulation across the United States and China, and worldwide. We also recognize that in addition to the written rules studied here, countries may also vary in their implementation.