Do share repurchases facilitate movement toward target capital structure? International evidence

•Under-levered firms are more likely to buy back shares right after share repurchase legalization.•Post-legalization repurchases facilitate firms’ movement toward target leverage, especially for under-levered firms.•The facilitating effect is stronger under lower repurchasing restriction, higher div...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of empirical finance Vol. 77; p. 101498
Main Authors Wang, Zigan, Yin, Qie Ellie, Yu, Luping
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier B.V 01.06.2024
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Summary:•Under-levered firms are more likely to buy back shares right after share repurchase legalization.•Post-legalization repurchases facilitate firms’ movement toward target leverage, especially for under-levered firms.•The facilitating effect is stronger under lower repurchasing restriction, higher dividend tax penalty, and lower financial constraint. We use a new international setting to test and strengthen identification of the “target leverage” hypothesis in the payout policy literature. We conduct a quasi-natural experiment induced by staggered share repurchase legalization in 17 economies and analyze its influences on leverage dynamics. After controlling for other repurchasing motives, firms under-leveraged before legalization are more likely to buy back shares immediately after legalization. Post-legalization repurchases also facilitate firms’ movement toward target leverage, especially when firms are under-leveraged. This facilitating effect is stronger under lower repurchasing restriction, higher dividend tax penalty, and lower financial constraint.
ISSN:0927-5398
1879-1727
DOI:10.1016/j.jempfin.2024.101498