A puzzle about de rebus beliefs

The standard theory of propositions is argued to lead to a contradiction in the case of plural quantification & the propositions expressed by sentences in which a plurally quantified statement of the type There are critics who admire only one another is the object of a belief. Among the readings...

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Published inAnalysis (Oxford) Vol. 60; no. 4; pp. 297 - 299
Main Authors McGee, Vann, Rayo, Agustín
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.10.2000
Blackwell Publishers
Basil Blackwell Ltd
Subjects
Logic puzzles
Philosophical object
Platonism
Propositional attitudes
Propositional functions
Singular propositions
State espionage
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Summary:The standard theory of propositions is argued to lead to a contradiction in the case of plural quantification & the propositions expressed by sentences in which a plurally quantified statement of the type There are critics who admire only one another is the object of a belief. Among the readings of such a sentence is a de rebus reading, "There are some critics of whom X believes that they admire only one another"; a propositional property defined as puzzlement over certain other propositions is, however, recursively attributable to particular de rebus propositions, with the result that the second-order de rebus proposition must be one of the first-order ones. 8 References. J. Hitchcock
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ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 23
ISSN:0003-2638
1467-8284
DOI:10.1093/analys/60.4.297