Pessimistic aesthetics and the re-valuation of guilty pleasures: on the moral and metaphysical significance of escapism

• Published in: Journal of aesthetics & culture Vol. 16; no. 1
• Main Author: Dalton, Drew M.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Taylor & Francis Group 31.12.2024
• Subjects: epistemology; escapism; guilty pleasures; Kant; Pessimism; Schopenhauer
• ISSN: 2000-4214; 2000-4214
• DOI: 10.1080/20004214.2024.2341722

ABSTRACTThere is a previously unrecognized coupling which underlies the Western evaluation of aesthetic experiences. By and large, we are taught that for our aesthetic pleasures to have any “value” (i.e. to be good) they must do more than merely entertain, distract, or delight. Instead, they should confront us with some “truth” about the nature of our existence and/or guide us to some “reality” concerning the state of our world. This paper asks: 1) whence this prejudice concerning the value of our aesthetic experiences? 2) What metaphysical and ethical assumptions underlie this epistemological standard? And, finally, 3) how might our expectations concerning the nature and value of aesthetic experiences alter if these assumptions are called into question, as they are, for example, by contemporary metaphysical pessimism? This paper uses the concept of “guilty pleasures” as a site to expose the history of our Western assumptions concerning the evaluation of aesthetic experiences and to explore how a pessimistic revaluation of reality might change our analysis of what comprises “good” art. To this end, this paper traces the origins of our aesthetic assumptions in the West, shows how these assumptions continue to influence our aesthetic expectations today, exposes the hidden metaphysical premises, which underly those expectations, and explores why and how we might call these premises into question through a pessimistic revaluation of existence. All of these supports, in the end, a critical reassessment of the status and value our so-called “guilty pleasures.”