Countermeasure against probabilistic blinding attack in practical quantum key distribution systems

In a practical quantum key distribution（QKD） system, imperfect equipment, especially the single-photon detector,can be eavesdropped on by a blinding attack. However, the original blinding attack may be discovered by directly detecting the current. In this paper, we propose a probabilistic blinding a...

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Published inChinese physics B Vol. 24; no. 9; pp. 111 - 115
Main Author 钱泳君 李宏伟 何德勇 银振强 张春梅 陈巍 王双 韩正甫
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published 01.09.2015
Subjects
Bit error rate
Computer information security
Countermeasures
Detectors
Mathematical models
Probabilistic methods
Probability theory
Quantum cryptography
分配系统
单光子探测器
攻击模型
比特错误率
直接检测
约束问题
量子密钥分配
随机
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ISSN1674-1056
2058-3834
1741-4199
DOI10.1088/1674-1056/24/9/090305

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Summary:In a practical quantum key distribution（QKD） system, imperfect equipment, especially the single-photon detector,can be eavesdropped on by a blinding attack. However, the original blinding attack may be discovered by directly detecting the current. In this paper, we propose a probabilistic blinding attack model, where Eve probabilistically applies a blinding attack without being caught by using only an existing intuitive countermeasure. More precisely, our countermeasure solves the problem of how to define the bound in the limitation of precision of current detection, and then we prove security of the practical system by considering the current parameter. Meanwhile, we discuss the bound of the quantum bit error rate（QBER） introduced by Eve, by which Eve can acquire information without the countermeasure.
Bibliography:countermeasure bound,single-photon detector,probabilistic blinding attack,quantum key distribution
In a practical quantum key distribution（QKD） system, imperfect equipment, especially the single-photon detector,can be eavesdropped on by a blinding attack. However, the original blinding attack may be discovered by directly detecting the current. In this paper, we propose a probabilistic blinding attack model, where Eve probabilistically applies a blinding attack without being caught by using only an existing intuitive countermeasure. More precisely, our countermeasure solves the problem of how to define the bound in the limitation of precision of current detection, and then we prove security of the practical system by considering the current parameter. Meanwhile, we discuss the bound of the quantum bit error rate（QBER） introduced by Eve, by which Eve can acquire information without the countermeasure.
11-5639/O4
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SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
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ISSN:1674-1056
2058-3834
1741-4199
DOI:10.1088/1674-1056/24/9/090305