A Security Proof of Measurement Device Independent Quantum Key Distribution: From the View of Information Theory

Although some ideal quantum key distribution protocols have been proved to be secure, there have been some demonstrations that practical quantum key distribution implementations were hacked due to some real-life imperfections. Among these attacks, detector side channel attacks may be the most seriou...

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Published inChinese physics letters Vol. 31; no. 7; pp. 16 - 19
Main Author 李芳毅 银振强 李宏伟 陈巍 王双 温浩 赵义博 韩正甫
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published 01.07.2014
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ISSN0256-307X
1741-3540
DOI10.1088/0256-307X/31/7/070302

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Summary:Although some ideal quantum key distribution protocols have been proved to be secure, there have been some demonstrations that practical quantum key distribution implementations were hacked due to some real-life imperfections. Among these attacks, detector side channel attacks may be the most serious. Recently, a measurement device independent quantum key distribution protocol [Phys. Rev. Lett. 108 (2012) 130503] was proposed and all detector side channel attacks are removed in this scheme. Here a new security proof based on quantum information theory is given. The eavesdropper's information of the sifted key bits is bounded. Then with this bound, the final secure key bit rate can be obtained.
Bibliography:LI Fang-Yi , YIN Zhen-Qiang , LI Hong-Wei , CHEN Wei, WANG Shuang , WEN Hao, ZHAO Yi-Bo , HAN Zheng-Fu(1Key Lab of Quantum Information, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026 ;2 Synergetic Innovation Center of Quantum Information and Quantum Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026 ; 3 Information Engineering College, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310023 ; 4 Anhui Qasky Quantum Science and Technology Co. Ltd., Wuhu 241002)
11-1959/O4
Although some ideal quantum key distribution protocols have been proved to be secure, there have been some demonstrations that practical quantum key distribution implementations were hacked due to some real-life imperfections. Among these attacks, detector side channel attacks may be the most serious. Recently, a measurement device independent quantum key distribution protocol [Phys. Rev. Lett. 108 (2012) 130503] was proposed and all detector side channel attacks are removed in this scheme. Here a new security proof based on quantum information theory is given. The eavesdropper's information of the sifted key bits is bounded. Then with this bound, the final secure key bit rate can be obtained.
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ISSN:0256-307X
1741-3540
DOI:10.1088/0256-307X/31/7/070302