Towards solving psychology’s fundamental problem
The problem driving this debate issue is old, going back to at least to the 17th century. Yet, psychologists are no closer to solving the problem now than they were centuries ago. In this article I argue that the reason for the lack of definitive solution is that disputants share assumptions that ma...
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Published in | Theory & psychology Vol. 34; no. 3; pp. 362 - 376 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
London, England
SAGE Publications
01.06.2024
Sage Publications Ltd |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
ISSN | 0959-3543 1461-7447 |
DOI | 10.1177/09593543241254798 |
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Summary: | The problem driving this debate issue is old, going back to at least to the 17th century. Yet, psychologists are no closer to solving the problem now than they were centuries ago. In this article I argue that the reason for the lack of definitive solution is that disputants share assumptions that make the problem unsolvable. More specifically, the problem is based on the assumptions that (a) the knowledge field of psychology is coherent and (b) natural scientists employ a common inquiry approach. Both are troublesome. As such, instead of asking questions such as “Should psychologists follow the natural sciences?” it would be much more meaningful to ask questions such as “What does it look like for psychologists in this subfield to follow a scientific approach?” |
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 14 |
ISSN: | 0959-3543 1461-7447 |
DOI: | 10.1177/09593543241254798 |