US Patronage, State Capacity, and Civil Conflict

Leaders need resources to maintain power. To secure these resources, states can develop their own extractive capacity or seek external support to help subsidize their costs. In this study, we argue that extractive capacity and external support are not always alternatives. We focus on how US support...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe Journal of politics Vol. 84; no. 2; pp. 767 - 782
Main Authors DiGiuseppe, Matthew, Shea, Patrick E.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Chicago The University of Chicago Press 01.04.2022
University of Chicago Press
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Summary:Leaders need resources to maintain power. To secure these resources, states can develop their own extractive capacity or seek external support to help subsidize their costs. In this study, we argue that extractive capacity and external support are not always alternatives. We focus on how US support can foster local property rights, which subsequently builds extractive capacity. We then argue that states with more capacity are better able to either alleviate rebels’ grievances or deter rebels from mounting a military challenge. We use mediation analysis to test these expectations with a data set on capacity, US support, and civil conflict from 1970 to 2012. We find empirical support for the role of property rights and capacity as mediating factors between US support and civil conflict. Our results have implications for international explanations of civil conflict and the role of US patronage in capacity development.
ISSN:0022-3816
1468-2508
DOI:10.1086/715598