There Are No Ahistorical Theories of Function
Theories of function are conventionally divided up into historical and ahistorical ones. Proponents of ahistorical theories often cite the ahistoricity of their accounts as a major virtue. Here, I argue that none of the mainstream “ahistorical” accounts are actually ahistorical. All of them refer, i...
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Published in | Philosophy of science Vol. 86; no. 5; pp. 1146 - 1156 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Cambridge
The University of Chicago Press
01.12.2019
Cambridge University Press |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | Theories of function are conventionally divided up into historical and ahistorical ones. Proponents of ahistorical theories often cite the ahistoricity of their accounts as a major virtue. Here, I argue that none of the mainstream “ahistorical” accounts are actually ahistorical. All of them refer, implicitly or explicitly, to history. In Boorse’s goal-contribution account, history is latent in the idea of statistical typicality. In the propensity theory, history is implicit in the idea of a species’ natural habitat. In the causal role theory, history is required for making sense of dysfunction. I elaborate some consequences for the functions debate. |
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ISSN: | 0031-8248 1539-767X |
DOI: | 10.1086/705472 |