Oakeshott's Theory of Freedom as Recognized Contingency

This article argues that Oakeshott's theory of freedom possesses a greater degree of coherence than is often perceived. Freedom in Oakeshott's philosophy may be defined as `recognized contingency', combining the notions of a genuine choice of action and of an agent's awareness of...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEuropean journal of political theory Vol. 2; no. 1; pp. 57 - 77
Main Author Podoksik, Efraim
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published London SAGE Publications 01.01.2003
Subjects
Agency
Choices
Freedom
Idealism
Liberalism
Michael Oakeshott
Philosophy
Political Science Theories
Political theory
Rule of law
liberalism
rule of law
negative liberty
idealism
freedom
Oakeshott
human agency
civil association
contingency
choice
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Summary:This article argues that Oakeshott's theory of freedom possesses a greater degree of coherence than is often perceived. Freedom in Oakeshott's philosophy may be defined as `recognized contingency', combining the notions of a genuine choice of action and of an agent's awareness of having such a choice. Oakeshott employs his notion of freedom in two different contexts. One is the context in which freedom is understood as a concept distinguishing what is conceived as `human' from what is conceived as `non-human'. The other context is that of membership in societies, which under certain circumstances can be characterized either by the presence or the lack of freedom. The article argues that, while at first glance Oakeshott's ideas look counter-intuitive, at a deeper level this understanding of freedom is akin to that prevalent in the consciousness of modern liberal societies.
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ISSN:1474-8851
1741-2730
DOI:10.1177/1474885103002001279