Simulating policy interventions in the interfirm diffusion of low-carbon technologies: An agent-based evolutionary game model

• Published in: Journal of cleaner production Vol. 250; p. 119449
• Main Authors: Shi, Yingying, Han, Botang, Zeng, Yongchao
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Elsevier Ltd 20.03.2020
• Subjects: Agent-based modeling; Evolutionary game theory; Low-carbon technology diffusion; Agent-based modeling; Low-carbon technology diffusion; Evolutionary game theory
• ISSN: 0959-6526; 1879-1786
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.119449

Policy interventions are frequently used by authorities around the world to mitigate carbon emissions. However, economic systems are essentially complex adaptive systems, which often exhibit unexpected responses to exogenous interventions and leave intervenors in a dilemma, even if the interventions are elaborately designed. To explore the behaviors of the diffusion system regarding low-carbon technologies, this study builds an agent-based model (ABM) to simulate enterprises’ reactions to multiple policy interventions aimed at spurring low-carbon technology diffusion. The simulated enterprises are in a complex network where they play evolutionary games with their neighbors, which enables the model to possess two critical features of economic systems: adaptiveness and equilibrium. The model reveals a dilemma of policy interventions: intuitively, carbon taxes, asymmetric penalties (only imposed on un-low-carbon enterprises) and subsidies can improve the diffusion, which is consistent with previous research; counter-intuitively, all these policies turn out to be inefficient or even harmful to low-carbon enterprises because of the diffusion system’s high adaptiveness. Specifically, when carbon taxes and penalties increase, both the low-carbon and un-low-carbon enterprises end up with the equilibrium of equivalent but lower profits. In contrast, all the enterprises earn equivalent but more profits even though subsidies are only given to the low-carbon enterprises, which implies that the un-low-carbon enterprises (indirectly) grab a portion of the subsidies and accordingly weaken the incentive effect of subsidies. These system behaviors are summarized as “equalizing effect” because the system tends to equalize the impact of both positive and negative interventions among all enterprises even though the policy interventions are asymmetrically imposed on one type of the enterprises. The findings also indicate that policies implemented to enlarge green market sizes can help policymakers bypass the dilemma.