Independence in Administrative Adjudications: When and Why Agency Judges Are Subject to Deference and Influence

Are administrative adjudicators subject to external influence and pressures? We present the results from a nationwide survey of agency adjudicators, focusing on immigration judges (IJs) and administrative law judges (ALJs) in the Social Security Administration (SSA). ALJs follow decisional procedure...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inAdministration & society Vol. 52; no. 2; pp. 171 - 206
Main Authors Chand, Daniel E., Schreckhise, William Dean
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Los Angeles, CA SAGE Publications 01.02.2020
SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC
Subjects
Adjudicators
Administrative law
Administrative procedure
Attitudes
Deference
Immigration
Immigration policy
Independence
Interest groups
Judges & magistrates
Legislatures
Social security
social security disablity
immigration
administrative adjudication
administrative judges
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN0095-3997
1552-3039
DOI10.1177/0095399718760593

Cover

More Information
Summary:Are administrative adjudicators subject to external influence and pressures? We present the results from a nationwide survey of agency adjudicators, focusing on immigration judges (IJs) and administrative law judges (ALJs) in the Social Security Administration (SSA). ALJs follow decisional procedures spelled out in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and are given substantial legal protections from agency pressures. IJs do not follow APA procedures, nor do they receive its protections. We find IJs give significantly greater deference to the positions of the public, their agency, Congress, and the president, and report more favorable attitudes toward interest groups in adjudications.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 14
ISSN:0095-3997
1552-3039
DOI:10.1177/0095399718760593