Deviating from the ideal

• Published in: Philosophy and phenomenological research Vol. 107; no. 1; pp. 31 - 52
• Main Author: Barrett, Jacob
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: 01.07.2023
• Subjects: ideal benchmark; ideal theory; justice; nonideal theory; problem solving
• ISSN: 0031-8205; 1933-1592
• DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12902

Ideal theorists aim to describe the ideally just society. Problem solvers aim to identify concrete changes to actual societies that would make them more just. The relation between these two sorts of theorizing is highly contested. According to the benchmark view, ideal theory is prior to problem solving because a conception of the ideally just society serves as an indispensable benchmark for evaluating societies in terms of how far they deviate from it. In this paper, I clarify the benchmark view, argue that existing criticisms of it are unsuccessful, and develop a novel redundancy objection to the benchmark view and the claim of priority it allegedly entails. I then consider the extent to which ideal theory might facilitate problem solving without being prior to it and argue that it can only play a modest role in this regard. The upshot is that ideal theory is neither required for nor especially relevant to problem solving—but it is not completely irrelevant either. It facilitates problem solving to some limited degree, but no more, say, than theorizing about dystopia.