Okinawa Confidential, 1969 Exploring the Linkage between the Nuclear Issue and the Base Issue

This article demonstrates that during the 1969 Okinawa reversion negotiations, there were both secret agreements and disagreements between the U.S. and Japan regarding the conditions applied to the use of United States bases on Okinawa after reversion. The United States sought to preserve the unrest...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inDiplomatic history Vol. 37; no. 4; pp. 807 - 840
Main Author KOMINE, YUKINORI
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford Oxford University Press 01.09.2013
Subjects
American history
Diplomacy
International relations-US
Military bases
Nuclear weapons
Political alliances
United States > US
Okinawa
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Summary:This article demonstrates that during the 1969 Okinawa reversion negotiations, there were both secret agreements and disagreements between the U.S. and Japan regarding the conditions applied to the use of United States bases on Okinawa after reversion. The United States sought to preserve the unrestricted use of its bases on Okinawa for conventional combat operations in regional contingencies including Korea, Taiwan, and Indochina, as well as the emergency re-entry and transit rights of nuclear weapons. Due to the antinuclear public sentiment and fear of the entrapment into regional conflicts, Japan pursued the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from Okinawa. While the United States insisted on making confidential written arrangements for the nuclear and base issues, Japan attempted to focus on public statements to explain mutual agreements but provided verbal private assurances. In the end, the United States and Japan agreed to maintain U.S. base functions for the continued U.S. deterrent capabilities in East Asia.
ISSN:0145-2096
1467-7709
DOI:10.1093/dh/dht039