The Law or the Career? Autocratic Judiciaries, Strategic Sentencing, and Political Repression

• Published in: Comparative political studies Vol. 58; no. 10; pp. 2296 - 2328
• Main Authors: Liu, Howard, Su, Ching-Hsuan, Wang, Yi-Ting
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Los Angeles, CA SAGE Publications 01.09.2025; SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC
• Subjects: Autocracy; Autonomy; Criminal sentences; Judges & magistrates; Oppression; Rule of law; Sanctions; Scrutiny; law and courts; military trials; judges; state repression; Taiwan; authoritarian regimes
• ISSN: 0010-4140; 1552-3829
• DOI: 10.1177/00104140241290212

Why do judges sometimes act against autocrats’ will, even without judicial independence and tenure security? Contrary to the theory of strategic defection under weak governments, we argue that this behavior can also emerge under strong governments with lax monitoring. When autocrats primarily monitor severe political cases, judges can strategically downplay case severity to avoid oversight, thereby increasing judicial autonomy and the rule of law. Yet, these adjustments will be carefully calibrated–sufficient to evade scrutiny but not too drastic to trigger autocrats’ suspicions and incur sanctions against judges. We test this expectation with new data on Taiwan’s military trials during authoritarian rule, finding that judges tend not to issue sentences above a review threshold after its introduction. Sentence reductions are mostly moderate, affecting cases where sentences can fall slightly above or below the threshold under judges’ discretion. These findings have implications for understanding state repression and judicial agency in nondemocracies.