Homo Kantius Sovereign Subject and Bare Thing

3 Alternatively, Schmitt's text is an attack on Hans Kelsen's Kantian attempt to base all legal points of ascription on one fundamental Grundnorm.4 These contacts with Neo-Kantianism may well help explain why certain Kantian themes surreptitiously appear in Agamben's analysis, but do...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inPhilosophy today (Celina) Vol. 54; no. 2; pp. 121 - 131
Main Author Padui, Raoni
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Chicago, IL DePaul University 2010
Philosophy Documentation Center
Subjects
Colonies & territories
Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge
Philosophy
Chicago Illinois
Relation
Transcendental
Law
Knowledge theory
Thing itself
Object
Limit
Knowledge
Subject
Online AccessGet full text
ISSN0031-8256
2329-8596
DOI10.5840/philtoday201054221

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Summary:3 Alternatively, Schmitt's text is an attack on Hans Kelsen's Kantian attempt to base all legal points of ascription on one fundamental Grundnorm.4 These contacts with Neo-Kantianism may well help explain why certain Kantian themes surreptitiously appear in Agamben's analysis, but do they justify their extension to the supposed epistemological problems of the first Critique? Since we do not want to justify this extension by appealing to facts and possibly mistaking the quid facti for the quid juris, the legitimacy must rest on Kant's own text.
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ISSN:0031-8256
2329-8596
DOI:10.5840/philtoday201054221