Compensation and Moral Luck

Abstract In some vicarious cases of compensation, an agent seems obligated to compensate for a harm they did not inflict. This raises the problem that obligations for compensation may arise out of circumstantial luck. That is, an agent may owe compensation for a harm that was outside their control....

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Bibliographic Details
Published inThe Monist Vol. 104; no. 2; pp. 251 - 264
Main Author Heinzelmann, Nora
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford University Press 01.04.2021
Hegeler Institute
Subjects
Analysis
Compensation (Law)
Fortune
Influence
Germany
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Summary:Abstract In some vicarious cases of compensation, an agent seems obligated to compensate for a harm they did not inflict. This raises the problem that obligations for compensation may arise out of circumstantial luck. That is, an agent may owe compensation for a harm that was outside their control. Addressing this issue, I identify five conditions for compensation from the literature: causal engagement, proxy, ill-gotten gains, constitution, and affiliation. I argue that only two of them specify genuine and irreducible grounds for compensation, and that factors determining the agent’s obligations may be beyond their control. However, I suggest that this is unproblematic. There is thus no problem of circumstantial moral luck for compensation.
ISSN:0026-9662
2153-3601
DOI:10.1093/monist/onaa036