Are Composite Subjects Possible? A Clarification of the Subject Combination Problem Facing Panpsychism
Panpsychism, the view that phenomenal consciousness is present at the fundamental physical level, faces the subject combination problem––the question of whether (and how) subjects of experience can combine. While various solutions to the problem have been proposed, these often seem to be based on a...
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Published in | European Journal of Analytic Philosophy Vol. 20; no. 1; pp. 205 - 229 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
University of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
01.01.2024
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Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | Panpsychism, the view that phenomenal consciousness is present at the fundamental physical level, faces the subject combination problem––the question of whether (and how) subjects of experience can combine. While various solutions to the problem have been proposed, these often seem to be based on a misunderstanding of the threat posed by the subject combination problem. An example is the exchange in this journal between Siddharth (2021) and Miller (2022). Siddharth argued that the phenomenal bonding solution failed to address the subject combination problem, while Miller responded that Siddharth had (among other things) misunderstood the problem that the phenomenal bonding solution was trying to solve. In this paper, I seek to clarify the real subject combination problem facing panpsychism, and on this basis, evaluate the various attempts at defending the possibility of subject composition.
Panpsihizam, gledište da je fenomenalna svijest prisutna na fundamentalnoj fizičkoj razini, suočava se s problemom kombinacije subjekata—pitanjem mogu li se (i kako) subjekti iskustva kombinirati. Iako su predložena različita rješenja za taj problem, često se čini da se temelje na pogrešnom razumijevanju izazova koji predstavlja problem kombinacije subjekata. Primjer je razmjena u ovom časopisu između Siddhartha (2021) i Millera (2022). Siddharth je tvrdio da rješenje fenomenalnog povezivanja nije uspjelo riješiti problem kombinacije subjekata, dok je Miller odgovorio da je Siddharth (između ostalog) pogrešno razumio problem koji je rješenje fenomenalnog povezivanja pokušavalo riješiti. U ovom radu nastojim razjasniti stvarni problem kombinacije subjekata s kojim se suočava panpsihizam i na temelju toga procijeniti različite pokušaje obrane mogućnosti sastava subjekata. |
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ISSN: | 1747-9991 1845-8475 1849-0514 1747-9991 |
DOI: | 10.31820/ejap.20.1.9 |