Cognitive phenomenology and metacognitive feelings

The cognitive phenomenology thesis claims that “there is something it is like” to have cognitive states such as believing, desiring, hoping, attending, and so on. In support of this idea, Goldman claimed that the tip‐of‐the‐tongue phenomenon can be considered as a clear‐cut instance of nonsensory co...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inMind & language Vol. 34; no. 2; pp. 247 - 262
Main Author Arango‐Muñoz, Santiago
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.04.2019
Wiley Subscription Services, Inc
Subjects
bodily feelings
Cognition
cognitive phenomenology
Emotions
feeling of knowing
introspection
Metacognition
metacognitive feelings
Phenomenology
Tip of the tongue phenomenon
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:The cognitive phenomenology thesis claims that “there is something it is like” to have cognitive states such as believing, desiring, hoping, attending, and so on. In support of this idea, Goldman claimed that the tip‐of‐the‐tongue phenomenon can be considered as a clear‐cut instance of nonsensory cognitive phenomenology. This paper reviews Goldman's proposal and assesses whether the tip‐of‐the‐tongue and other metacognitive feelings actually constitute an instance of cognitive phenomenology. The paper will show that psychological data cast doubt on the idea that the tip‐of‐the‐tongue and other metacognitive feelings are clear‐cut instances of cognitive phenomenology.
ISSN:0268-1064
1468-0017
DOI:10.1111/mila.12215