The godfather provides: Enduring corruption and organizational hierarchy in the Kenyan police service

Despite government commitments to mitigate corruption and strengthen mechanisms of accountability in state security sectors, reform efforts frequently fail to curb illegal practices by state agents. Scholars offer explanations that range from deeply embedded societal norms of appropriate behavior to...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inGovernance (Oxford) Vol. 36; no. 2; pp. 401 - 419
Main Authors Mutahi, Njoroge, Micheni, Makena, Lake, Milli
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Hoboken, USA John Wiley & Sons, Inc 01.04.2023
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Subjects
Accountability
Case studies
Corruption
Hierarchies
Incentives
Innovations
National security
Police
Reforms
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Summary:Despite government commitments to mitigate corruption and strengthen mechanisms of accountability in state security sectors, reform efforts frequently fail to curb illegal practices by state agents. Scholars offer explanations that range from deeply embedded societal norms of appropriate behavior to rational accounts emphasizing the individualized benefits corruption can offer. Using a case study of the Service Standing Orders in Kenya's National Police Service however, we build on the work of Persson et al.'s analysis to show how corrupt practices on the part of street‐level agents are reinforced within organizational hierarchies, through institutionalized—rather than personalized—incentives and obligations. As a result, policy innovations that do not explicitly identify the countervailing incentives created through internal command structures are likely to miss potentially fruitful avenues for institutional reform.
ISSN:0952-1895
1468-0491
DOI:10.1111/gove.12672