The extension of color sensations: Reid, Stewart, and Fearn

According to Reid, color sensations are not extended nor are they arranged in figured patterns. Reid further claimed that 'there is no sensation appropriated to visible figure.' Reid justified these controversial claims by appeal to Cheselden's report of the experiences of a young man...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inCanadian journal of philosophy Vol. 41; no. S1; pp. 50 - 79
Main Author Grandi, Giovanni B.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Edmonton Routledge 01.07.2014
Taylor & Francis
Cambridge University Press
Subjects
Cataracts
Color
Dualism
Dugald Stewart
extension
Eyes
Fearn, John
John Fearn
mind-body dualism
PERCEPTION
Perception theory
Perceptual experiences
Philosophers
Philosophy
Reid, Thomas
Retina
Sensation
Sensory perception
Somatosensory perception
Soul
Stewart, Dugald (1753-1828)
Thomas Reid
vision
Visual perception
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:According to Reid, color sensations are not extended nor are they arranged in figured patterns. Reid further claimed that 'there is no sensation appropriated to visible figure.' Reid justified these controversial claims by appeal to Cheselden's report of the experiences of a young man affected by severe cataracts, and by appeal to cases of perception of visible figure without color. While holding fast to the principle that sensations are not extended, Dugald Stewart (1753-1828) tried to show that 'a variety of colour sensations is a necessary means for the perception of visible figure.' According to John Fearn (1768-1837), two motives appear to be central to Reid's views about color sensations and extension: his commitment to the Cartesian doctrine of the immateriality of the soul, and his attempt to evade 'Hume's dilemma' about the existence and immateriality of the soul.
ISSN:0045-5091
1911-0820
DOI:10.1080/00455091.2014.897475