Attacks on cryptosystems implemented via VLSI: A review

Serious threats to the VLSI crypto devices are posed by the Side Channel Attack (SCA) that utilizes the devices’ SCI (Side Channel Information) to break the entire cryptographic algorithm. Motive in this severe breach of security fence is to decipher the secret key for retrieval of confidential data...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of information security and applications Vol. 60; p. 102861
Main Authors Sravani, M.M., Ananiah Durai, S.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier Ltd 01.08.2021
Subjects
Countermeasure
Cryptanalysis
Hardware Trojan
Side channel attack
Side channel information
VLSI
Cryptanalysis
Side channel attack
Countermeasure
Side channel information
VLSI
Hardware Trojan
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Summary:Serious threats to the VLSI crypto devices are posed by the Side Channel Attack (SCA) that utilizes the devices’ SCI (Side Channel Information) to break the entire cryptographic algorithm. Motive in this severe breach of security fence is to decipher the secret key for retrieval of confidential data. Recently, Hardware Trojan (HT) insertions that maliciously modify the circuitry of the crypto integrated chips are reported. Circuit behavioral alterations caused by the inserted Trojan, resulted in dysfunction/SCI leak of the device. The major focus of this paper is to report a comprehensive survey on cryptanalysis based strategies, employed by SCA and HT techniques, to successfully attack the VLSI crypto-devices. Cryptanalyst security breach schemes on specific VLSI devices are also reviewed. The employed attack-specific countermeasure techniques are also examined. Further, the limitations in implementation of these countermeasures in the system level design for ASIC, FPGA and SoC VLSI devices are provided. The weakness of each countermeasure for a specific application has also been analyzed.
ISSN:2214-2126
DOI:10.1016/j.jisa.2021.102861