Agent Reliabilism and Inferential Knowledge from Gettiered Belief
Epistemologists have generally accepted that competently deduced, known conclusions must issue from known premises, as the principle of Counter-Closure demands; however, some have recently challenged the notion, arguing that knowledge may be inferred from non-knowledge. In this paper, I focus on the...
Saved in:
Published in | Episteme Vol. 19; no. 1; pp. 130 - 145 |
---|---|
Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Cambridge, UK
Cambridge University Press
01.03.2022
|
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
Cover
Loading…
Summary: | Epistemologists have generally accepted that competently deduced, known conclusions must issue from known premises, as the principle of Counter-Closure demands; however, some have recently challenged the notion, arguing that knowledge may be inferred from non-knowledge. In this paper, I focus on the yet unexamined topic of inferential knowledge from Gettiered belief with regard to Greco's virtue-epistemic framework, which he refers to as ‘agent reliabilism’. I argue that agent reliabilism allows for instances of Counter-Closure violation. In presenting my argument, I construct and provide an analysis of a case that challenges Counter-Closure, and defend the case against various possible objections, including some that feature in mainstream Counter-Closure literature. I contend that, if my analysis is accepted, Greco is left with two options: either he rejects Counter-Closure, or he must substantially revise his view in such a way as to preserve Counter-Closure in light of cases of inferential knowledge from Gettiered belief. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1742-3600 1750-0117 |
DOI: | 10.1017/epi.2020.15 |