Agent Reliabilism and Inferential Knowledge from Gettiered Belief

Epistemologists have generally accepted that competently deduced, known conclusions must issue from known premises, as the principle of Counter-Closure demands; however, some have recently challenged the notion, arguing that knowledge may be inferred from non-knowledge. In this paper, I focus on the...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEpisteme Vol. 19; no. 1; pp. 130 - 145
Main Author Olivier, K. Merrick
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press 01.03.2022
Subjects
Beliefs
Epistemology
Knowledge
Sheep
counter-closure
Greco
virtue epistemology
Gettier
agent reliabilism
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Summary:Epistemologists have generally accepted that competently deduced, known conclusions must issue from known premises, as the principle of Counter-Closure demands; however, some have recently challenged the notion, arguing that knowledge may be inferred from non-knowledge. In this paper, I focus on the yet unexamined topic of inferential knowledge from Gettiered belief with regard to Greco's virtue-epistemic framework, which he refers to as ‘agent reliabilism’. I argue that agent reliabilism allows for instances of Counter-Closure violation. In presenting my argument, I construct and provide an analysis of a case that challenges Counter-Closure, and defend the case against various possible objections, including some that feature in mainstream Counter-Closure literature. I contend that, if my analysis is accepted, Greco is left with two options: either he rejects Counter-Closure, or he must substantially revise his view in such a way as to preserve Counter-Closure in light of cases of inferential knowledge from Gettiered belief.
ISSN:1742-3600
1750-0117
DOI:10.1017/epi.2020.15