How the Doctrine of Double Effect Rhetoric Harms Patients Seeking Voluntary Assisted Dying

Victoria's Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2017 (Vic) became the first state law to permit VAD in Australia under limited circumstances from June 2019. Before this, many palliative care physicians relied on the doctrine of double effect (DDE) to justify the use of pain relievers for terminally ill...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inJournal of bioethical inquiry
Main Author Kendal, E
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Netherlands 29.03.2024
Subjects
Doctrine of double effect
Voluntary assisted dying
Abortion
Euthanasia
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Summary:Victoria's Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2017 (Vic) became the first state law to permit VAD in Australia under limited circumstances from June 2019. Before this, many palliative care physicians relied on the doctrine of double effect (DDE) to justify the use of pain relievers for terminally ill patients that were known to hasten death. The DDE claims that there is a morally significant difference between intending evil and merely foreseeing some bad side-effect will occur as a result of one's actions. This article argues that the legacy of the DDE is promoting inequitable access to VAD in Victoria due to the assumption that death represents an "evil" for the patient and that the intentions of physicians providing VAD cannot be trusted. The latter claim relies on two common objections to the DDE: the risk of "purifying the intentions" and the issue of "closeness" when evaluating moral acts under this theory.
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ISSN:1176-7529
1872-4353
DOI:10.1007/s11673-024-10340-4