Effect of pseudo-random number on the security of quantum key distribution protocol

• Published in: Chinese physics B Vol. 34; no. 2; pp. 20301 - 45
• Main Authors: Yang, Xiao-Liang, Li, Yu-Qing, Li, Hong-Wei
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Chinese Physical Society and IOP Publishing Ltd 01.01.2025
• Subjects: pseudo-random; quantum key distribution; security; quantum key distribution; security; pseudo-random
• ISSN: 1674-1056; 2058-3834
• DOI: 10.1088/1674-1056/ad99c9

In the process of quantum key distribution (QKD), the communicating parties need to randomly determine quantum states and measurement bases. To ensure the security of key distribution, we aim to use true random sequences generated by true random number generators as the source of randomness. In practical systems, due to the difficulty of obtaining true random numbers, pseudo-random number generators are used instead. Although the random numbers generated by pseudo-random number generators are statistically random, meeting the requirements of uniform distribution and independence, they rely on an initial seed to generate corresponding pseudo-random sequences. Attackers may predict future elements from the initial elements of the random sequence, posing a security risk to quantum key distribution. This paper analyzes the problems existing in current pseudo-random number generators and proposes corresponding attack methods and applicable scenarios based on the vulnerabilities in the pseudo-random sequence generation process. Under certain conditions, it is possible to obtain the keys of the communicating parties with very low error rates, thus effectively attacking the quantum key system. This paper presents new requirements for the use of random numbers in quantum key systems, which can effectively guide the security evaluation of quantum key distribution protocols.