Objectivism, Hybridism, and Meaning in Life: Reply to Evers and van Smeden

• Published in: The Southern journal of philosophy Vol. 55; no. 3; pp. 306 - 313
• Main Author: Landau, Iddo
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Memphis Southern Journal of Philosophy 01.09.2017
• Subjects: Objectivity; Philosophy
• ISSN: 0038-4283; 2041-6962
• DOI: 10.1111/sjp.12239

In a recent article in this journal, Daan Evers and Gerlinde Emma van Smeden () defend Wolf's hybridism against objectivist counterexamples advanced by Metz, Smuts, and Bramble. They also offer their own new hybridism, which they take to be even less vulnerable to such counterexamples. In this paper, I argue that Evers and van Smeden's defense of their and Wolf's hybridizing from objectivist counterexamples is problematic and that they do not, in fact, succeed in meeting the challenge the objectivist counterexamples pose. Evers and van Smeden do not read the counterexamples charitably and, hence, are not coping with the strongest challenges the counterexamples have to offer. I conclude that Metz's, Smuts's and Bramble's objectivist counterexamples continue to pose serious challenges to hybridism, both in Wolf's and in Evers and van Smeden's versions.