Relativism and Two Kinds of Branching Time

This essay examines the case for relativism about future contingents in light of a distinction between two ways of interpreting the ‘branching time’ framework. The first step of the relativist argument is to argue for the ‘Non‐Determination Thesis’, the view that there is no unique actual future. Th...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inPacific philosophical quarterly Vol. 104; no. 2; pp. 465 - 492
Main Author Ninan, Dilip
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Los Angeles Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.06.2023
Subjects
Identity
Philosophy
Relativism
Time
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:This essay examines the case for relativism about future contingents in light of a distinction between two ways of interpreting the ‘branching time’ framework. The first step of the relativist argument is to argue for the ‘Non‐Determination Thesis’, the view that there is no unique actual future. The second step is to argue from the Non‐Determination Thesis to relativism. I show that first step of this argument fails. But despite that result, the second step is still of interest, because one might hold the Non‐Determination Thesis on alternative grounds. I then argue that whether the second step of the argument succeeds depends on how the branches in question are interpreted. If the branches are ersatz possible worlds, then the argument for relativism might go through. But if the branches are concrete parts of a ‘branching multiverse’, then the argument for relativism turns out to make implausible assumptions about the nature of personal identity over time.
Bibliography:For helpful comments and discussion, thanks to Bryan Pickel, Brian Rabern, Wolfgang Schwarz, Stephan Torre, and an audience at the University of Edinburgh. Thanks also to an anonymous referee and to the editors of
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
.
ISSN:0279-0750
1468-0114
DOI:10.1111/papq.12418