Joint Admittance Perturbation and Meter Protection for Mitigating Stealthy FDI Attacks Against Power System State Estimation

• Published in: IEEE transactions on power systems Vol. 35; no. 2; pp. 1468 - 1478
• Main Authors: Liu, Chensheng, Liang, Hao, Chen, Tongwen, Wu, Jing, Long, Chengnian
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York IEEE 01.03.2020; The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
• Subjects: Admittance; Admittance measurement; admittance perturbation; Algorithms; Combinatorial analysis; Computer simulation; Electrical impedance; False data injection attack; Heuristic methods; Measuring instruments; meter protection; Meters; Optimization; Perturbation; Perturbation methods; power system state estimation; Power systems; Recoverability; Recovery; State estimation; Transmission line measurements
• ISSN: 0885-8950; 1558-0679
• DOI: 10.1109/TPWRS.2019.2938223

Power system state estimation is subject to false data injection (FDI) attacks, because of the integration of advanced computation and communication techniques in power systems. By coordinately tampering the readings of meters, FDI attacks can bypass bad data detectors and stealthily mislead the results of state estimation. In this paper, we propose a joint admittance perturbation and meter protection (JAPMP) strategy to enhance the resilience of state estimation under stealthy FDI attacks, i.e., recover system states from compromised measurements. State recovery conditions in JAPMP are derived, which indicate that the integration of admittance perturbation and meter protection can significantly improve the recoverability of system states. Based on the state recovery conditions, a JAPMP optimization problem is formulated and solved by decomposing the joint optimization problem into two subproblems. Then, a heuristic algorithm is designed, which can greatly reduce the computational complexity in solving the combinatorial problem. Based on the simulation results on a 6-bus, the IEEE 14-bus, the IEEE 57-bus and the IEEE 118-bus test systems, the protection cost and performance of state recovery under stealthy FDI attacks are evaluated.