An Absence of Malice The Limited Utility of Campaigning Against Party Corruption

We examine whether repeated scandals within one party generate collective sanctions for fellow partisans. Do voters punish a party’s candidates because of multiple corruption scandals? Our data come from a unique survey conducted prior to the 2010 legislative elections in North Carolina, a state tha...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inAmerican politics research Vol. 43; no. 6; pp. 923 - 951
Main Authors Cobb, Michael D., Taylor, Andrew J.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Los Angeles, CA SAGE Publications 01.11.2015
SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC
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Summary:We examine whether repeated scandals within one party generate collective sanctions for fellow partisans. Do voters punish a party’s candidates because of multiple corruption scandals? Our data come from a unique survey conducted prior to the 2010 legislative elections in North Carolina, a state that had recently seen a number of high-profile corruption scandals involving Democrats exclusively. Although Republicans campaigned energetically against “the party of corruption,” we find the impact of that campaign was muted. Respondents who accurately identified at least one scandal rated the Democratic Party less favorably and thought Republicans would do better at responding to corruption. Nevertheless, vote choice was unrelated to knowledge of corruption scandals, and Republicans did not benefit from any effects on voter turnout. Importantly, respondents’ partisanship only sometimes mediated attitudes and did not affect behavior. We conclude that voters might in theory prefer “clean” parties, but their political actions are uninfluenced by that preference, a finding that has unfortunate implications for democracy.
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ISSN:1532-673X
1552-3373
DOI:10.1177/1532673X15570470