Secure Source Identification Scheme for Revocable Instruction Sharing in Vehicle Platoon

• Published in: IEEE transactions on intelligent transportation systems Vol. 25; no. 5; pp. 3671 - 3684
• Main Authors: Zhao, Yanan, Yu, Haiyang, Liang, Yuhao, Brighente, Alessandro, Conti, Mauro, Sun, Jianfei, Ren, Yilong
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York IEEE 01.05.2024; The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
• Subjects: Access control; bilateral access control; Cryptography; Data sources; Denial of service attacks; Encryption; fine-grained; In vehicle; Performance evaluation; Proposals; revocation; Security; Soft sensors; source identification; Transportation; Vehicle platoon; Vehicles; Wireless communication
• ISSN: 1524-9050; 1558-0016
• DOI: 10.1109/TITS.2023.3329488

The secure transmission of instructions among vehicles in a platoon is one of the most essential needs for a vehicle platoon. Despite the existence of cryptographic methods to securely share instructions, instruction sharing is still subject to forgery, tampering, and denial-of-service attacks. Therefore, it is urgent to find a solution to perform data source identification to filter out irrelevant information (not instructions) while ensuring the authenticity of encrypted instructions is urgent to address. In addition, immediate revocation of credentials is also a crucial requirement for a vehicle platoon when an authorized vehicle member misbehaves. In this paper, we propose the first Secure Source Identification Scheme for Revocable Instruction Sharing (SI-RIS) to securely simultaneously achieve bilateral fine-grained access control, data source identification, immediate vehicle user revocation, and efficient encryption in vehicle platoons. Specifically, our SI-RIS solution supports fine-grained access control for both the sender and receiver over the encrypted instructions. As a result, only authorized correspondents are able to access the commands. Furthermore, upon identification of malicious members in the platoon, our SI-RIS provides an efficient direct vehicle user revocation mechanism capable of immediate revocation credentials without affecting other vehicles. We prove the security of our SI-RIS via rigorous mathematical security proof. Moreover, performance evaluation and comparisons illustrate the feasibility and practicability of SI-RIS for vehicle platoon.