Sampled-Data Dynamic Event-Triggering Control for Networked Systems Subject to DoS Attacks

The paper proposes a co-design framework for event-triggered stabilization control of a class of networked control systems (NCS) under unknown DoS attacks. To reduce the number of control inputs, a sampled-data dynamic event-triggering (S-DET) scheme is developed. Both the state measurements and mon...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inIEEE transactions on network science and engineering Vol. 8; no. 3; pp. 1978 - 1990
Main Authors Amini, Amir, Asif, Amir, Mohammadi, Arash, Azarbahram, Ali
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Piscataway IEEE 01.07.2021
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
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Summary:The paper proposes a co-design framework for event-triggered stabilization control of a class of networked control systems (NCS) under unknown DoS attacks. To reduce the number of control inputs, a sampled-data dynamic event-triggering (S-DET) scheme is developed. Both the state measurements and monitoring of the S-DET are conducted periodically. The parameter design is based on the solution of linear matrix inequalities (LMI) obtained from a delay-dependent Lyapunov-Krasovskii functional (LKF) using the improved free weighting matrix (IFWM) technique. In the presence of DoS with unknown patterns, the proposed co-design framework is beneficial in two ways. (i): The desired level of resilience to DoS is included as a design input. (ii): The upper-bound for guaranteed resilience associated with the proposed co-design approach is less conservative (larger) as compared to those obtained from other analytical solutions. The proposed co-design approach demonstrates the trade-off between the DoS resilience level and system performance indices. Numerical experiments quantify the effectiveness of the proposed approach both in terms of reducing the number of control updates and providing higher resilience to unknown DoS attacks.
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ISSN:2327-4697
2334-329X
DOI:10.1109/TNSE.2021.3070804