Beyond compassion fatigue, compassion as a virtue

One of the great problems of caregivers and health professionals in recent times has been the so-called compassion fatigue and its association with burnout syndrome. Another pole of compassion has been described in terms of compassion satisfaction. Both propositions could be problematic in the careg...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inNursing ethics Vol. 31; no. 1; pp. 114 - 123
Main Authors Garcia-Uribe, John Camilo, Pinto-Bustamante, Boris Julian
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published London, England SAGE Publications 01.02.2024
Subjects
Burnout, Professional - etiology
Compassion Fatigue
Empathy
Humans
Job Satisfaction
Personal Satisfaction
Quality of Life
Surveys and Questionnaires
Virtues
compassion fatigue
compassion
burnout
compassion satisfaction
virtues
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Summary:One of the great problems of caregivers and health professionals in recent times has been the so-called compassion fatigue and its association with burnout syndrome. Another pole of compassion has been described in terms of compassion satisfaction. Both propositions could be problematic in the caregiving setting. This is an analytical reflective article that through an apparent aporia tries to problematize and propose a theoretical synthesis that allows to denote compassion as a virtue in Aristotelian terms. To this end, it resorts to etymologies, translations and mainly to the classical theoretical references regarding compassion fatigue, compassion satisfaction and, of course, Aristotelian ethics. This is a theoretical bet that leaves open the discussion regarding the dichotomies compassion fatigue and compassion satisfaction; apathy and hyperpathy; and proposes to rethink compassion as a virtue, a reasoned middle ground, contextualized in the framework of care between two possible excesses.
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ISSN:0969-7330
1477-0989
DOI:10.1177/09697330231196228