The Polluter Pays Principle as a policy tool in an externality model for nitrogen fertilizer pollution

A policy based on the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) with respect to the subject of contamination by nitrogen fertilizer is proposed. The mechanism is tested via a cost-efficient input tax policy to supply clean drinking water that is subject to contamination by nitrogen fertilizer and to quantify th...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inWater policy Vol. 14; no. 3; pp. 470 - 489
Main Authors Fishman, Yaron, Becker, Nir, Shechter, Mordechai
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published London International Water Association 01.06.2012
IWA Publishing
Subjects
Applied sciences
Biological and medical sciences
Contamination
Cost analysis
Drinking water
Exact sciences and technology
Externality
Fertilizers
Groundwaters
Intervention
Medical sciences
Natural water pollution
Nitrogen
Pesticides, fertilizers and other agrochemicals toxicology
Pollution
Pollution abatement
Pollution control
Scarcity
Taxation
Toxicology
Water pollution
Water scarcity
Water supply
Water treatment and pollution
Welfare
Policy
Groundwater contamination
Water policy tools
Welfare change
Economic incentive
Empirical method
Water pollution
Polluter pays principle
Modeling
Economic incentives
Ground water
Fertilizers
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Summary:A policy based on the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) with respect to the subject of contamination by nitrogen fertilizer is proposed. The mechanism is tested via a cost-efficient input tax policy to supply clean drinking water that is subject to contamination by nitrogen fertilizer and to quantify the welfare change due to public control. The paper proposes, for different water scarcity conditions, a policy that supports the legal principle of the PPP, by compensating the victim for the residual pollution not abated by the cost efficient solution, without any effects on the efficiency criterion. By introducing a Welfare Change Index (WCI) which measures the significance of an authority's intervention in dealing with externalities, we suggest that for relatively high and moderate water scarcity conditions, welfare change supports public intervention. However, for low scarcity conditions, welfare change is low, which discourages public intervention.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 14
ISSN:1366-7017
1996-9759
DOI:10.2166/wp.2011.139