Strategic satisficing: Civil-military relations and French intervention in Africa

Few issues are more important yet less understood than outside interventions in intra-state conflicts. Under what circumstances do intervening states further their interests and when, contrarily, do they plunge into quagmires? France is a critical case. It is, statistically, the world’s second inter...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inEuropean journal of international security Vol. 4; no. 2; pp. 163 - 189
Main Author DeVore, Marc R.
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press 01.06.2019
Subjects
Armed forces
Civil war
Cold War
Colonies & territories
Counterinsurgency
Empowerment
International relations
Military policy
Politics
Population
Power
Rebellions
Research Article
France
Mali
Africa
Intervention
Civil Wars
Civil-Military Relations
France
Counterinsurgency
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Summary:Few issues are more important yet less understood than outside interventions in intra-state conflicts. Under what circumstances do intervening states further their interests and when, contrarily, do they plunge into quagmires? France is a critical case. It is, statistically, the world’s second intervenor and earned the sobriquet of Africa’s gendarme through frequent interventions in African wars. The ability of such a medium-sized state to intervene with greater regularity and ostensible success than larger powers raises questions about how France manages its interventions. Do French interventions draw on the French Army’s distinctive ‘school’ of population-centric counterinsurgency, which emphasises the need to militarise governance in pursuit of comprehensive victories? Or do the French Fifth Republic’s civil-military institutions encourage policymakers to carefully regulate force’s employment in pursuit of limited ends? This study draws on declassified archives to test which approach most characterises French interventions. To preview my conclusions, strategic satisficing – the use of minimal force for short durations to produce satisfactory outcomes – distinguishes the Fifth Republic’s interventions from other powers’ practices and prior French counterinsurgencies. This particular form of interventionism enables France to influence a large number of intra-state conflicts and maintain a network of security agreements with African states.
ISSN:2057-5637
2057-5645
DOI:10.1017/eis.2019.1