Human Dignity as a Form of Life: Notes on Its Foundations and Meaning in Institutional Morality

In normative terms, human dignity usually implies two consequences: (a) human beings cannot be treated in some particular ways due to their condition as humans; and (b) some forms of life do not correspond to the ideal life of our community. This study consists in discussing the meaning of this idea...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inInternational journal for the semiotics of law = Revue internationale de sémiotique juridique Vol. 33; no. 1; pp. 47 - 63
Main Author de Matos, Saulo Monteiro Martinho
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01.03.2020
Subjects
Applied Linguistics
Fundamentals of Law
Law
Law and Criminolgy
Legal History
Philosophy of Law
Theories of Law
Status
Form of life
Human dignity
Humiliation
Institutions
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Summary:In normative terms, human dignity usually implies two consequences: (a) human beings cannot be treated in some particular ways due to their condition as humans; and (b) some forms of life do not correspond to the ideal life of our community. This study consists in discussing the meaning of this idea of human dignity in contrast to the concept of humiliation in the context of institutional, i.e. political and legal, rights. Two concepts of human dignity will be discussed. The first absolute/necessary and formal/transcendental concept implies the proposition “because human beings have dignity, the following cluster of rights is valid”. Conversely, the second contingent and material concept corresponds to the thought “for being able to live in dignity, we must respect the following rights”. This paper claims that human dignity should be understood as the right to be protected from humiliation. Humiliation is the situation of incapacity or absence of self-determination.
ISSN:0952-8059
1572-8722
DOI:10.1007/s11196-019-09662-z