Distributed Optimal Fault Estimation and Fault-Tolerant Control for Interconnected Systems: A Stackelberg Differential Graphical Game Approach

• Published in: IEEE transactions on automatic control Vol. 67; no. 2; pp. 926 - 933
• Main Authors: Xu, Yuhang, Yang, Hao, Jiang, Bin, Polycarpou, Marios M.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York IEEE 01.02.2022; The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
• Subjects: Bidirectional control; Control systems design; Controllers; Fault estimation (FE); Fault tolerance; Fault tolerant systems; fault-tolerant control (FTC); Game theory; Games; graphical game; Interconnected systems; Iron; Observers; Stackelberg differential game; Subsystems
• ISSN: 0018-9286; 1558-2523
• DOI: 10.1109/TAC.2021.3074284

This article addresses the distributed optimal fault estimation (FE) and fault-tolerant control (FTC) issues under the bidirectional interaction between a possibly faulty interconnected system and its associated diagnostic interconnected observer. The proposed methodology is based on a framework, named Stackelberg differential graphical game , in which the interconnected observer and its corresponding interconnected system are formulated as two graphical games, and they, respectively, play the role of the follower and leader to make sequential decisions of the FE and the FTC. Such a framework allows us to fully reveal the property of the bidirectional interaction, based on which a distributed optimal FE and FTC scheme is developed. Moreover, a new concept named interactive Stackelberg equilibrium is proposed, where, to reach this equilibrium, an auxiliary controller is suitably designed for each subobserver. In this way, this auxiliary controller can cooperate with other auxiliary controllers of subobservers, and noncooperate with controllers of subsystems, which helps to achieve the distributed optimal FE and FTC goals.