Overvalued Equity and the Accruals Anomaly: Evidence from Insider Trades

This paper examines the accruals anomaly in an agency context where managers of overvalued firms have incentives to sustain overvaluation. We hypothesize that mangers anticipate the ultimate share price reversals and use high accruals to temporarily sustain overvaluation, while at the same time sell...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inProcedia economics and finance Vol. 2; pp. 91 - 100
Main Authors Sawicki, Julia, Shrestha, Keshab
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Elsevier B.V 2012
Subjects
Accruals Anomaly
Agency theory
Earnings management
Insider Trading
Misvaluation
Overvalued equity
Earnings management
Insider Trading
Overvalued equity
Accruals Anomaly
Misvaluation
Agency theory
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

More Information
Summary:This paper examines the accruals anomaly in an agency context where managers of overvalued firms have incentives to sustain overvaluation. We hypothesize that mangers anticipate the ultimate share price reversals and use high accruals to temporarily sustain overvaluation, while at the same time sell their shares. There is no incentive to deflate earnings of undervalued firms, leading to the prediction of an asymmetric relationship between trading and accruals. Our results support an agency explanation. Quadratic and binary regressions confirm that relationship between trades and accruals is concentrated on the selling side. The relationship between accruals and trading is only significant within the overvalued, low book-to-market (BM) firms. There is also evidence that low BM firms manage their earnings upward compared to high BM firms
ISSN:2212-5671
2212-5671
DOI:10.1016/S2212-5671(12)00068-8