Mean Field Games With Parametrized Followers

We consider mean field games between a dominant leader and many followers, such that each follower is subject to a heterogeneous delay effect from the leader's action, who in turn can exercise governance on the population through this influence. The delay effects are assumed to be discretely di...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published inIEEE transactions on automatic control Vol. 65; no. 1; pp. 12 - 27
Main Authors Bensoussan, Alain, Cass, Thomas, Chau, Man Ho Michael, Yam, Sheung Chi Phillip
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York IEEE 01.01.2020
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subjects
Online AccessGet full text

Cover

Loading…
More Information
Summary:We consider mean field games between a dominant leader and many followers, such that each follower is subject to a heterogeneous delay effect from the leader's action, who in turn can exercise governance on the population through this influence. The delay effects are assumed to be discretely distributed among the followers. Given regular enough coefficients, we describe a necessary condition for the existence of a solution for the equilibrium by a system of coupled forward-backward stochastic differential equations and stochastic partial differential equations. We provide a thorough study for the particular linear quadratic case. By adopting a functional approach, we obtain the time-independent sufficient condition, which warrants the unique existence of the solution of the whole mean field game problem. Several numerical illustrations with different time horizons and populations are demonstrated.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 14
ISSN:0018-9286
1558-2523
DOI:10.1109/TAC.2019.2910945