Principle, Proceduralism, and Precaution in a Community of Rights

• Published in: Ratio juris Vol. 19; no. 2; pp. 141 - 168
• Main Authors: BEYLEVELD, DERYCK, BROWNSWORD, ROGER
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.06.2006
• ISSN: 0952-1917; 1467-9337
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9337.2006.00321.x

.  This paper presents a sketch of the way in which an ideal‐typical community of rights, Gewirthia, responds to the so‐called “internal problem of authority.” Notwithstanding the deep moral consensus in Gewirthia, where citizens are fully committed to the Principle of Generic Consistency (requiring that agents respect one another’s freedom and basic well‐being), Gewirthians make no claim to “know all the answers.” In consequence, public governance in Gewirthia needs a strategy for dealing with the many kinds of disputes—disputes that relate to matters of both principle and practice—that require authoritative settlement. In this context, having outlined the nature of (and justification for) the procedural strategy that Gewirthia adopts in order to resolve such disputes, we discuss the range of regulatory questions that are potentially moot in Gewirthia, and focus on three hard cases in which the State might argue for a precautionary licence—namely, where there is a dispute about indirect and speculative harm to rights‐holders, about harm to arguable rights‐holders, and about the possible corrosion of the conditions that are essential for the sustainability of a moral community.