Timing attack on NoC-based systems: Prime+Probe attack and NoC-based protection

Many authors have shown how to break the AES cryptographic algorithm with side channel attacks; specially the timing attacks oriented to caches, like Prime+Probe. In this paper, we present two practical timing attacks on NoC that improve Prime+Probe technique, the P+P Firecracker, and P+P Arrow. Our...

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Published inMicroprocessors and microsystems Vol. 52; pp. 556 - 565
Main Authors Reinbrecht, Cezar, Susin, Altamiro, Bossuet, Lilian, Sigl, Georg, Sepúlveda, Johanna
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Kidlington Elsevier B.V 01.07.2017
Elsevier BV
Elsevier
Subjects
Cache
Communications systems
Computer memory
Computer Science
Cryptography
Cryptography and Security
Electronics
Engineering Sciences
Integrated circuits
Network-on-Chip
Security NoC
System on chip
Time measurement
Timing attack
Timing side-channel attack
Timing side-channel attack
Security NoC
Network-on-Chip
Timing attack
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Summary:Many authors have shown how to break the AES cryptographic algorithm with side channel attacks; specially the timing attacks oriented to caches, like Prime+Probe. In this paper, we present two practical timing attacks on NoC that improve Prime+Probe technique, the P+P Firecracker, and P+P Arrow. Our attacks target the communication between an ARM Cortex-A9 core and a shared cache memory. Furthermore, we evaluate a secure enhanced NoC as a countermeasure against the timing attack. Finally, we demonstrate that attacks on MPSoCs through the NoC are a real threat and need to be further explored.
ISSN:0141-9331
1872-9436
DOI:10.1016/j.micpro.2016.12.010