Dimensions of explanation

• Published in: Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce (Online) Vol. 74; no. 74; pp. 57 - 98
• Main Author: Hochstein, Eric
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English; German
• Published: Copernicus Center Press 01.01.2023
• Subjects: communicative concept of explanation; evaluative dimension; mechanistic explanation; ontic conception of explanation; Philosophy; Philosophy of Science; representational concept of explanation; Special Branches of Philosophy; evaluative dimension; representational concept of explanation; mechanistic explanation; communicative concept of explanation; ontic conception of explanation
• ISSN: 0867-8286; 2451-0602
• DOI: 10.59203/zfn.74.607

Some argue that the term “explanation” in science is ambiguous, referring to at least three distinct concepts: a communicative concept, a representational concept, and an ontic concept. Each is defined in a different way with its own sets of norms and goals, and each of which can apply in contexts where the others do not. In this paper, I argue that such a view is false. Instead, I propose that a scientific explanation is a complex entity that can always be analyzed along a communicative dimension, a representational dimension, and an ontic dimension. But all three are always present within scientific explanations. I highlight what such an account looks like, and the potential problems it faces (namely that a single explanation can appear to have incompatible sets of norms and goals that govern it). I propose a solution to this problem and demonstrate how this account can help to dissolve current disputes in philosophy of science regarding debates between epistemic and ontic accounts of mechanistic explanations in the life sciences.