Explanation, representation and information

• Published in: Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce (Online) Vol. 74; no. 74; pp. 21 - 55
• Main Author: Karadimas, Panagiotis
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English; German
• Published: Copernicus Center Press 01.01.2023
• Subjects: epistemic conception of explanation; ontic conception of explanation; optimization process; Philosophy; Philosophy of Science; representation; scientific explanation; Special Branches of Philosophy; optimization process; scientific explanation; representation; ontic conception of explanation; epistemic conception of explanation
• ISSN: 0867-8286; 2451-0602
• DOI: 10.59203/zfn.74.636

The ontic conception of explanation is predicated on the proposition that “explanation is a relation between real objects in the world” and hence, according to this approach, scientific explanation cannot take place absent such a premise. Despite the fact that critics have emphasized several drawbacks of the ontic conception, as for example its inability to address the so-called “abstract explanations”, the debate is not settled and the ontic view can claim to capture cases of explanation that are non-abstract, such as causal relations between events. However, by eliminating the distinction between abstract and non-abstract explanations, it follows that ontic and epistemic proposals can no longer contend to capture different cases of explanation and either all are captured by the ontic view or all are captured by the epistemic view. On closer inspection, it turns out that the ontic view deals with events that fall outside the scientists’ scope of observation and that it does not accommodate common instances of explanation such as explanations from false propositions and hence it cannot establish itself as the dominant philosophical stance with respect to explanation. On the contrary, the epistemic conception does account for almost all episodes of explanation and can be described as a relation between representations, whereby the explanans transmit information to the explanandum and that this information can come, dependent on context, in the form of any of the available theories of explanation (law-like, unificatory, causal and non-causal). The range of application of the ontic view thus is severely restricted to trivial cases of explanation that come through direct observation of the events involved in an explanation and explanation is to be mostly conceived epistemically.