Three Roles of Empirical Information in Philosophy: Intuitions on Mathematics do Not Come for Free

This work gives a new argument for ‘Empirical Philosophy of Mathematical Practice’. It analyses different modalities on how empirical information can influence philosophical endeavours. We evoke the classical dichotomy between “armchair” philosophy and empirical/experimental philosophy, and claim th...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inKRITERION – Journal of Philosophy Vol. 35; no. 3; pp. 247 - 278
Main Authors Kant, Deborah, Pérez-Escobar, José Antonio, Sarikaya, Deniz
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published De Gruyter 30.12.2021
Subjects
empirical ethics
empirical philosophy of mind
empirically informed philosophy
Humanities and Social Sciences
large cardinals
Mathematics
Philosophy
philosophy of mathematical practice
study of cultures and practices
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Summary:This work gives a new argument for ‘Empirical Philosophy of Mathematical Practice’. It analyses different modalities on how empirical information can influence philosophical endeavours. We evoke the classical dichotomy between “armchair” philosophy and empirical/experimental philosophy, and claim that the latter should in turn be subdivided in three distinct styles: , , and . This is a shift of focus from the source of the information towards its use by philosophers. We present several examples from philosophy of mind/science and ethics on one side and a case study from philosophy of mathematics on the other. We argue that empirically informed philosophy of mathematics is different from the rest in a way that encourages a approach, because intuitions about mathematical objects are often unavailable for non-mathematicians (since they are sometimes hard to grasp even for mathematicians). This consideration is supported by a case study in set theory.
ISSN:2750-977X
2750-977X
DOI:10.1515/krt-2021-0025