Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness
In the racial gerrymandering cases, the Supreme Court has confronted state action that, though undeniably race-conscious, does not appear to single out any identifiable group of persons for special disadvantage because of their race. Though various members of the Court have argued in dissent that th...
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Published in | Michigan law review Vol. 96; no. 2; pp. 245 - 337 |
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Main Author | |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
Ann Arbor
University of Michigan Law School
01.11.1997
Michigan Law Review Association |
Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | In the racial gerrymandering cases, the Supreme Court has confronted state action that, though undeniably race-conscious, does not appear to single out any identifiable group of persons for special disadvantage because of their race. Though various members of the Court have argued in dissent that the action could not violate the Equal Protection Clause precisely for this reason, a consistent 5-member majority has steadfastly ignored this argument. This majority has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause as giving all persons a substantive constitutional right not to be dealt with by the state on the basis of their race, whether or not this results from their being singled out for any special disadvantage because of their race. A paper argues that the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause embraced by the majority in the racial gerrymandering cases - though morally attractive, rhetorically powerful, and politically popular - is profoundly inconsistent with the original understanding of the 14 Amendment. |
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ISSN: | 0026-2234 1939-8557 |
DOI: | 10.2307/1290069 |