GNSS Spoofing Detection and Mitigation in Multireceiver Configuration via Tracklets and Spoofer Localization

• Published in: IEEE access Vol. 10; pp. 42000 - 42014
• Main Authors: Pardhasaradhi, Bethi, Srinath, Gunnery, Vandana, G. S., Srihari, Pathipati, Aparna, P.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Piscataway IEEE 2022; The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
• Subjects: Algorithms; Bearings; bearings only localization; Cartesian coordinates; Equivalence; Extended Kalman filter; Global navigation satellite system; GLRT; GNSS intentional interference; Interference; Jamming; Launching; Least squares; Likelihood ratio; Localization; Location awareness; Mathematical analysis; Navigation satellites; Position measurement; Receivers; Remotely piloted vehicles; Repeaters; Satellite tracking; Satellites; spoofer localization; Spoofing; spoofing detection
• ISSN: 2169-3536; 2169-3536
• DOI: 10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3160047

Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) sensors estimate its position, velocity, and time (PVT) using pseudorange measurements. When there is no interference, the pseudoranges are due to authentic satellites, and the bearings is distinguishable. Whereas, in the presence of any intentional interference source like spoofer, the pseudorange measurements owing to spurious signals and all the bearings from the same direction. These spurious attacks yield either no position or falsified position to the GNSS receiver. This paper proposes to install multiple GNSS receivers on a vehicle (assumed to be cooperative) to detect and mitigate the spoofing attack. While installing multiple GNSS receivers, we assume that each GNSS receiver's relative position vector (RPV) is assumed to be known to other GNSS receivers. The installed GNSS receivers use the extended Kalman filter (EKF) framework to estimate their PVT. We proposed to calculate the equivalent-measurement and equivalent-measurement covariance of each GNSS receiver in the Cartesian coordinates in the tracklet framework. These tracklets are translated to the vehicle center using RPV to obtain translated-tracklets. The translated tracklet based generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) is derived to detect the spoofing attack at a given epoch. In addition to that, these translated-tracklets are processed in a batch least square (LS) framework to obtain the vehicle position. Once the attack is detected at a specific epoch, it quantifies that the position information is false. Moreover, another spoofing test is also formulated using DOA of signals. Once both the tests confirm the spoofing attack, the spoofer localization is performed using pseudo-updated states of GNSS receivers and acquired bearings in the iterative least-squares (ILS) framework. Mitigation of spoofing attack can be achieved either by projecting a null beam in the direction of the spoofer or by launching a counter-attack on the spoofer. The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm detects spoofing attacks and ensures continuity in the navigation track. As the number of satellite signals increases, the algorithms provide better position root mean square error (PRMSE) for GNSS receivers track, vehicle track, and spoofer localization.