We Should Not Be a Counterpart Theorist of Events If We Want to Be a Counterfactual Theorist of Causation

Although David Lewis advocates a counterpart‐theoretic treatment of objects but rejects a parallel treatment of events, many philosophers have — mainly to solve some puzzles within the framework of a Lewisian counterfactual analysis of causation — suggested that the counterpart‐theoretic treatment b...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inTheoria (Lund, Sweden) Vol. 87; no. 5; pp. 1038 - 1049
Main Author Tang, Zhiheng
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Chichester, UK John Wiley & Sons Ltd 01.10.2021
Subjects
causation
counterfactual theory
counterpart theory
events
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Summary:Although David Lewis advocates a counterpart‐theoretic treatment of objects but rejects a parallel treatment of events, many philosophers have — mainly to solve some puzzles within the framework of a Lewisian counterfactual analysis of causation — suggested that the counterpart‐theoretic treatment be extended to events. This article argues that we had better not be a counterpart theorist of events as long as we want to remain at all faithful to the counterfactual analysis of causation.
ISSN:0040-5825
1755-2567
DOI:10.1111/theo.12321