Market power issues in bid-based hydrothermal dispatch

The objective of this work is to investigate market power issues in bid-based hydrothermal scheduling. Initially, market power was simulated with a single stage Cournot-Nash equilibrium model. In this static model the equilibrium was calculated analytically. It was shown that the total production of...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inAnnals of operations research Vol. 117; no. 1; p. 247
Main Authors Barroso, Luiz Augusto N, Fampa, Marcia H C, Kelman, Rafael, Pereira, Mario V F
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published New York Springer Nature B.V 01.11.2002
Subjects
Bids
Case studies
Dynamic programming
Elasticity of demand
Electric utilities
Electricity distribution
Energy industry
Equilibrium
Expansion
Game theory
Generators
Natural gas prices
Operating costs
Operations research
Scheduling
Studies
Brazil
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Summary:The objective of this work is to investigate market power issues in bid-based hydrothermal scheduling. Initially, market power was simulated with a single stage Cournot-Nash equilibrium model. In this static model the equilibrium was calculated analytically. It was shown that the total production of N strategic agents is smaller than the least-cost solution by a factor of (N /(N +1)). Market power analysis for multiple stages was then carried through a stochastic dynamic programming scheme, where the decision in each stage and state is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of a multi-agent game. Case studies with data taken from the Brazilian system are presented. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
ISSN:0254-5330
1572-9338
DOI:10.1023/A:1021537910823