Market power issues in bid-based hydrothermal dispatch
The objective of this work is to investigate market power issues in bid-based hydrothermal scheduling. Initially, market power was simulated with a single stage Cournot-Nash equilibrium model. In this static model the equilibrium was calculated analytically. It was shown that the total production of...
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Published in | Annals of operations research Vol. 117; no. 1; p. 247 |
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Main Authors | , , , |
Format | Journal Article |
Language | English |
Published |
New York
Springer Nature B.V
01.11.2002
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Subjects | |
Online Access | Get full text |
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Summary: | The objective of this work is to investigate market power issues in bid-based hydrothermal scheduling. Initially, market power was simulated with a single stage Cournot-Nash equilibrium model. In this static model the equilibrium was calculated analytically. It was shown that the total production of N strategic agents is smaller than the least-cost solution by a factor of (N /(N +1)). Market power analysis for multiple stages was then carried through a stochastic dynamic programming scheme, where the decision in each stage and state is the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of a multi-agent game. Case studies with data taken from the Brazilian system are presented. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] |
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ISSN: | 0254-5330 1572-9338 |
DOI: | 10.1023/A:1021537910823 |