Defending internalism about unconscious phenomenal character

Two important questions arise concerning the properties that constitute the phenomenal characters of our experiences: first, where these properties exist, and, second, whether they are tied to our consciousness of them. Such properties can either exist externally to the perceiving subject, or intern...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inSynthese (Dordrecht) Vol. 203; no. 5; p. 169
Main Authors Marvan, Tomáš, Coleman, Sam
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 13.05.2024
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Color
Consciousness
Education
Epistemology
Logic
Metaphysics
Neurosciences
Optical properties
Original Research
Perceptions
Phenomenology
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Science
Physical properties
Phenomenal character
Unconsious qualities
Consciousness-independence
Unconscious colours
Perceptual states
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Summary:Two important questions arise concerning the properties that constitute the phenomenal characters of our experiences: first, where these properties exist, and, second, whether they are tied to our consciousness of them. Such properties can either exist externally to the perceiving subject, or internally to her. This article argues that phenomenal characters, and specifically the phenomenal characters of colours, may exist independently of consciousness and that they are internal to the subject. We defend this combination of claims against a recent criticism according to which the unconscious phenomenal character of colours exists externally to the subject. We defend internalism about (potentially unconscious) phenomenal character by appealing to recent neuroscientific and behavioural evidence, and by rejecting the claim that externalism about phenomenal character is dialectically in a better position than internalism. In addition, we briefly present certain difficulties for externalist views of phenomenal character. These concern cases where the perceptual relation fails, but a perceptual experience still results. These points suffice to defuse the externalist critique of our view, and support the internalist variant of the consciousness-independence claim as the most plausible account of the unconscious phenomenal character of colours.
ISSN:1573-0964
0039-7857
1573-0964
DOI:10.1007/s11229-024-04582-3