Relativism and Intracultural Conflict

A number of arguments against moral relativism are based on the reality of intracultural conflict or the related possibility of sliding down a slippery slope and out the door of morality altogether. The first batch of arguments draws upon the evident fact that cultures are not unitary or homogenous...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inActa analytica : philosophy and psychology Vol. 38; no. 3; pp. 537 - 549
Main Author Wreen, Michael
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01.09.2023
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects
Education
Epistemology
Logic
Metaphysics
Philosophy
Philosophy of Mind
Agent-centered relativism
Individual relativism
Intracultural conflict
Cultural relativism
Universalism
Appraiser-centered relativism
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Summary:A number of arguments against moral relativism are based on the reality of intracultural conflict or the related possibility of sliding down a slippery slope and out the door of morality altogether. The first batch of arguments draws upon the evident fact that cultures are not unitary or homogenous but contain subgroups at odds with each other. The second batch is based on the claim that if moral truth is relativized to a culture, consistency demands that it eventually be relativized to the individual, and with that comes the end of morality. In this paper, (A) moral relativism is first defined, clarified, and defended—these preliminaries being necessary, given what follows—and (B) the common but infrequently discussed arguments mentioned above are distinguished, exposed, explained, evaluated, and ultimately rejected.
ISSN:0353-5150
1874-6349
DOI:10.1007/s12136-022-00539-8