The finite subject and reflection in Jan Patočka

How should we conceive of the relationship between finite subjectivity and reflection? And what implications does this have for the phenomenological method? This article addresses these questions by reconstructing the main pillars of Patočka’s theory of the subject. I present three of Patočka’s key...

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Bibliographic Details
Published inStudies in East European thought Vol. 77; no. 3; pp. 427 - 445
Main Author Barcaro, Marco
Format Journal Article
LanguageEnglish
Published Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01.06.2025
Springer Nature B.V
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Summary:How should we conceive of the relationship between finite subjectivity and reflection? And what implications does this have for the phenomenological method? This article addresses these questions by reconstructing the main pillars of Patočka’s theory of the subject. I present three of Patočka’s key arguments related to finitude, consciousness, and the world (the primacy of the sum , the reduction to immanence, and temporality); then, after every argument, I outline their implications for Patočka’s philosophy. In particular, I highlight how Patočka’s thought implies a repositioning of the subject in the world to which it ontologically belongs and a reassessment of the meaning of reflection. These theoretical assumptions open phenomenology to a different understanding of the subject than it had previously possessed and promote rich analysis of the movements of existence. The most important implication of Patočka’s theory of finite subjectivity, however, concerns the concept of the world, which bear a significance that extends beyond its critical position vis-à-vis transcendental subjectivity.
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ISSN:0925-9392
1573-0948
DOI:10.1007/s11212-024-09646-1